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Abstract 
We consider the evolutionary plausibility of Osiurak & Reynaud’s arguments. We argue that 
technical reasoning is not quite the magic bullet that O&R assume, and instead propose a co-
evolutionary account of the interplay between technical reasoning and social learning, with 
language emerging as a vital issue neglected in O&R’s account. 
Main text 
For decades, high-fidelity social learning mechanisms like imitation and teaching have been 
touted as the fundamental pre-requisites for cumulative culture (Boyd & Richerson, 1996; 
Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993). Osiurak and Reynaud (O&R) provide a useful 
corrective to this narrative, instead highlighting technical reasoning as the overlooked 
“elephant in the room”. We are largely sympathetic to this argument – indeed our own 
transmission chain experiments demonstrate that cumulative improvements in tools can occur 
in the absence of opportunities for teaching and imitation (Caldwell & Millen, 2009; Zwirner 
& Thornton, 2015). However, we are sceptical that technical reasoning represents a magic 
bullet for understanding cumulative culture. 
First, O&R’s account is evolutionarily implausible, as it assumes that ancestral hominins 
must have made a giant cognitive leap to evolve modern technical reasoning skills before 
cumulative culture could get off the ground. O&R provide no suggestions as to what selective 
pressures might drive the evolution of technical reasoning in ancestral populations. If we are 
to understand the origins of human cumulative culture, a focus on proximate cognitive 
mechanisms must go hand-in-hand with attempts to understand ultimate, functional drivers. 
Second, by definition, culture of any kind (including cumulative culture) requires social 
learning (Boyd & Richerson 1985; Mesoudi & Thornton 2018). No account of the origins of 
cumulative culture can therefore be complete without consideration of how learned behaviour 
can be transmitted between individuals. O&R suggest that technical reasoning skills may 
themselves provide the cognitive foundations for imitation and teaching, but this again leaves 
open the question of how and why technical reasoning skills themselves originated. It also 
downplays the fact that social learning does pose specific cognitive challenges, not least the 
need for learners to direct their attention towards potentially profitable sources of social 
information (Kendal et al., 2018). In both humans and many non-human animals, social 
learning plays a vital role in the development of many fundamental aspects of behaviour, 
including parental care, foraging, communication and social conventions (Thornton & 
Clutton-Brock, 2011; Whiten, 2019). Thus, it is likely that social learning mechanisms pre-
dated and indeed scaffolded the later (genetic and/or cultural) evolution of human-like 
technical reasoning skills. Indeed, evidence suggests that the acquisition of technical skills in 
children is shaped and guided by social learning from experienced adults (Beck, Apperly, 
Chappell, Guthrie, & Cutting, 2011; Nielsen, 2013). 
The core of O&R’s argument is that “cumulative technological culture originates in non-
social cognitive skills” (our emphasis). A more plausible suggestion is that the sensory, 
motoric and cognitive mechanisms that underpin technical reasoning co-evolved with social 
learning in a positive feedback loop as human populations became increasingly reliant on 
tools and technologies to access resources following our ancestors’ invasion of the savannas 
(Caldwell, Renner, & Atkinson, 2018; Morgan et al., 2015; Zwirner & Thornton, 2015). 
There is compelling evidence that relatively simple learning processes can allow groups of 
animals to reach optimal solutions to problems that would be difficult for a single individual 
(Saldana, Fagot, Kirby, Smith, & Claidière, 2019; Sasaki & Biro, 2017). Thus, the core 
criteria for cumulative cultural evolution – that is sequential improvements in the 
performance of behaviour over multiple episodes of social transmission (Mesoudi & 
Thornton, 2018) – are likely to be present in some non-human animals. Processes similar to 
those found in other species may well have led to modest, cumulative improvements in early 
hominin tools. As our ancestors’ reliance on tools increased, so too would the benefits of 
mechanisms to understand how tools work and to transmit that information socially, in turn 
facilitating the production of more complex and effective tools. Consistent with this 
argument, evidence shows that teaching provides no clear advantage over other means of 
social learning in tasks involving structurally simple tools, but begins to provide important 
advantages as tools become more complex (Caldwell et al., 2018; Zwirner & Thornton, 
2015). The mutually reinforcing advantages of teaching and technical reasoning could 
therefore ratchet up, eventually opening up entirely new design spaces that could never have 
been reached without prior episodes of innovation and cultural transmission. Thus, while all 
putative examples of cumulative cultural evolution in other species are restricted to specific 
contexts where there is a single, fixed optimum behaviour (for instance, finding the most 
direct route between two points: Sasaki & Biro, 2017), the scope of human culture is open-
ended, with cultural traits that can continually change, recombine and diversify. 
The idea that teaching may have played an increasingly important role in human cultural 
transmission brings us to a vital element that is largely overlooked in O&R’s account: 
language. Critically, language allows us to teach in an almost infinite range of contexts, to 
pass on information about what not to do (which is all but impossible to extract through 
reverse engineering alone), and to request specific information when needed. This allows the 
scope of human teaching to surpass anything seen in other species, where teaching is 
restricted to specific, species-typical adaptive behaviours such as hunting (Thornton & 
Raihani, 2008). If the origins of language lie in the need to teach hard-to-learn skills to kin, as 
suggested by Laland (2017), it is also likely that the evolution of linguistic skills would have 
altered the selective environment for other cognitive traits. Thus, as our ancestors’ linguistic 
skills evolved, so too would the benefits of being able to represent, and convey information 
about, unobservable mental states and physical properties, eventually enabling targeted social 
transmission of technical knowledge from knowledgeable to naïve individuals. 
The challenge for students of cumulative culture is two-fold: we must both explain the origins 
of human cultural prowess – how is it that our ancestors began to diverge from other species? 
– and the later cumulative elaboration of tools, technologies and conventions. We applaud 
O&R for highlighting technical reasoning as an important piece of the puzzle, particularly 
with regards to the latter issue. However, their “technical reasoning hypothesis” cannot be 
seen as a competing theory to the more conventional emphasis on social learning, but rather 
as pinpointing one element in a feedback loop through which cognition, culture and 
technology co-evolve. 
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